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COMMENTS
Foreseeable Zone of Risk: An Analysis of
Florida's Off-Premises Liability Standard
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important questions that a business owner or pro-
spective landowner should ask is: Under what circumstances will I be
liable for injuries resulting, directly or indirectly, from my use and
enjoyment of this property? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is
relatively complex because a landowner may not only be liable for inju-
ries to invitees that occur on his premises, but may also be liable to
invitees who are injured off the landowner's premises.
As a general principle of tort law, an owner or possessor of land has
a duty to use reasonable efforts not to harm individuals outside his prem-
ises.' An owner may not intentionally or negligently allow harmful sub-
stances or objects from his property to harm individuals outside the
owner's premises.2 Similarly, "the occupier of land owes the invitee the
duty to inspect the premises, to discover dangerous conditions, and to
remedy them or warn invitees of their existence."3 The standard in Flor-
ida indicates that an owner owes to an employee-invitee or business
invitee the duty to:
use reasonable care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe
condition and to have, given the [invitee] timely notice or warning of
latent and concealed perils, "known to the [owner], or which, by the
exercise of due care, should have been known to him, and which were
not known [by the invitee], or which by exercise of due care could
not have been known to him.
' 4
While the previously noted standards relating to the duties of land-
1. See W.PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57 (1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER].
2. See id. at 386-87.
3. See KEATON, supra note 1, at 419 (noting that typical examples of invitees are store
customers; patrons of restaurants, taverns, banks, theaters, beaches, fairs and other places of
amusement; and patrons of other businesses open to the public. Moreover, invitees also include
drivers calling for or delivering goods purchased or sold, as well as a "large and miscellaneous
group of similar persons who are present in the interest of the occupier as well as of their own."
Id.; J.D. LEE & LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW LIABILITY AND LITIGATION 391 (1990). It should
be noted that this Comment will focus exclusively on invitees.
4. Hickory House v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 249, 252 (Fla. 1955).
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owners are generally accepted and settled, the issue of the duty of care
owed by a landowner to an invitee who is subsequently injured either
intentionally or inadvertently by a third party, while entirely off the
landowner's premises, is far less certain. Some jurisdictions have taken
a bright line approach so as to limit liability for landowners in off-prem-
ises injury cases,5 while other jurisdictions have found landowner liabil-
ity for off-premises injuries in circumstances where specific factors were
present.6
Florida has adopted the "foreseeable zone of risk" standard, under
which the courts will inquire as to whether the landowner has created a
foreseeable zone of risk beyond the boundaries of his property. If so, he
may be liable for injuries to off-premises invitees.7 This Comment ana-
lyzes this standard and its effectiveness.
In 1991, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of off-premises liability in Florida in the landmark case of Holiday
Inns v. Shelburne. No other court had previously enumerated factors
determinative to finding off-premises liability.9 In Shelburne, the court
held that a bar owner could be liable for a patron's injuries resulting
from an altercation in an adjacent lot that was not part of the premises
and was not owned by the bar.10 In so holding, this landmark case
opened the door for liability to be imposed on a landowner for injuries
sustained by invitees while the invitee is off the owner's premises and in
an area over which the owner does not, or may not, have explicit or
authorized control. More importantly, however, the court enumerated
several factors such as control, economic benefit, and foreseeability as
determinative in finding that an off-premises duty of care, and a corre-
sponding liability, existed."1
Unfortunately, the court did not clarify how those factors should be
weighed, whether all of the factors were required, or whether any one
factor would be sufficient to impose an off-premises duty of care."2 As
a consequence, subsequent case law has shown that the courts, including
5. See Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1994).
6. See Mulraney v. Aulleto's Catering, 680 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1996).
7. Johnson v. Howard Mark Prods., 608 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
8. 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
9. See Bruce Warner, Premises Liability in Florida After Holiday Inns, Inc v. Shelburne:
Will Florida Extend a Landowner's Duty of Care Beyond the Physical Boundaries of His
Property, 16 NoVA L. REV. 600 (1991). Although Chateloin v. Flanigan's Enterprises 423 So. 2d
1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), Woodford v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1955), and
Marhefka v. Monte Carlo Mgmt. Co., 358 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) had decided the issue,
Shelburne was the first case in which a court enumerated determinative factors.
10. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 323-24.
11. Id.
12. Id.
[Vol. 55:397
FLORIDA'S OFF-PREMISES LIABILITY STANDARD
the court in which Shelburne was decided, 3 have abandoned the formal-
istic application of the factors set out in Shelburne in favor of the appli-
cation of the judicially created "foreseeable zone of risk" standard,
despite the fact that this standard has generally led to an increased duty
of care to off-premises invitees. 4
This Comment seeks to accomplish three objectives: 1) to propose
that the "foreseeable zone of risk" standard in Florida has supplanted the
Shelburne factors as the standard for the determination of off-premises
duty of care; 2) to analyze the "foreseeable zone of risk" standard and
answer the question of when a landowner will owe a duty of care to off-
premises invitees and 3) to expostulate the belief that the "foreseeable
zone of risk" standard is an effective and equitable standard even though
it may lead to an increased duty of care and liability for landowners.
Part II of this Comment traces the development of off-premises lia-
bility up to the landmark Shelburne case, and analyzes the factors which
the court found determinative in finding an off-premises duty of care.
Part III analyzes the developments in off-premises liability since the
Shelburne case. Specifically, this Part analyzes the application of the
foreseeable zone of risk standard, which has essentially replaced the for-
malistic application of the factors set out in Shelburne. Part IV compares
the foreseeable zone of risk standard of off-premises liability in Florida
with the standards in various other jurisdictions. Part V briefly discusses
the importance of insurance as it relates to off-premises liability. Finally,
Part VI concludes that the "foreseeable zone of risk" standard is a highly
effective standard, and perhaps the most equitable standard, by which to
analyze off-premises duty of care.
II. SHELBURNE: OFF-PREMISES LIABILITY BEGINS
Although the Shelburne case was the first case in which a Florida
court held a landowner liable for injuries to off-premises invitees and
had delineated factors for such a finding, the Third District Court of
Appeals had actually addressed the subject on a previous occasion. 15 In
Chateloin v. Flanigan's Enterprises,16 a bar patron was shot by another
patron several miles away from the bar and a considerable amount of
time after they had left the establishment. 7 There, the court held that
where the injury is "too remote as to time and place" the owner would
13. See Gunlock v. Gill Hotels Co., 622 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
14. See Johnson v. Howard Mack Prods., 608 So. 2d 973, 938, (Fla. 2nd DCA 1992) (calling
for a case-specific standard of care requiring protection of invitees on nearby property).
15. See Warner, supra note 9, at 600.
16. 423 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
17. Id.
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not be liable. 18 Although the court in that case did not find the owner
liable, the wording of the decision left the door open for the possibility
that if an injury is not too remote in time and place, the owner may be
found liable for injuries to patrons which occur off-premises.
Nine years later, the Fourth District Court of Appeals was con-
fronted with that very issue in Holiday Inns v. Shelburne.19 In that case,
the plaintiffs were shot and injured within a short period of time after
leaving the establishment.20 All of the parties involved had been drink-
ing at the bar and as they left to get their cars in an adjacent parking lot,
a fight broke out resulting in serious injury and a death.21 At trial, evi-
dence was introduced which indicated that one of the bar's employees
had directed one of the patrons later injured to park on the adjacent lot,
where as many as forty to fifty percent of the bar patrons parked.22
Fights occurred with regularity at or near the bar, and evidence showed
that there were three to four fights a night on the weekends.23
In its rationale, the court was quick to point out that this case was
readily distinguishable from Chateloin, because the injuries in Shelburne
occurred only a few feet from the bar, and within only a few minutes of
the patrons having exited the bar. 4 By making this distinction, the court
paved the way for the imposition of off-premises liability upon the
landowner.
Next, the court applied an Indiana case, Ember v. B.F.D.25 In that
case, the court found a tavern owner liable for injuries to its patrons
beyond the tavern's property lines, under certain circumstances.26 The
court in Shelburne analyzed a number of factors or circumstances that
have been used by different courts in assessing liability for off-premises
injuries to justify finding that the landowner owes a duty of care to off-
premises invitees.2 7
18. Id.
19. 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
20. Id. at 324.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 328.
24. Id.
25. 490 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
26. See id. at 771-72.
27. See Warner, supra note 9, at 600-01 (it should be noted that Mr. Warner's article was
written prior to the development of the foreseeable zone of risk standard. Therefore, it does not
discuss or analyze that standard. Nonetheless, his article provides insight into the analysis of the
Shelburne case as well as to some factors used by other jurisdictions to find off-premises liability);
see generally James T.R. Jones, Trains, Trucks, and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetation
and a Landowner's Duty to Those Off-Premises 39 VILL. L. REV. 1263 (1994); George Bair
South, The Duty to Protect Customers from Criminal Acts Occurring off The Premises: The
Watering Down of the "Prior Similar Acts Rule," 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271 (1991).
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One such factor is where the landowner exercises control over the
off-premises area where the injury occurs.2 8 "Generally, an occupier of
land is deemed to have control only over the area which he possesses.
However, when a landowner treats his neighbor's property as an integral
part of his own, he is conceivably exercising control over the adjoining
land."29
In Shelburne, this factor was somewhat determinative since a secur-
ity guard employed by the bar instructed the injured party to park in an
adjacent lot because the bar did not have adequate parking.3° Moreover,
evidence at trial indicated that the bar routinely directed individuals to
park in adjacent lots. In fact, as many as forty to fifty percent of the bar
patrons were required to park off-premises. 3' Finally, evidence showed
that the bar had actually even installed lighting in another lot adjacent to
the bar.32 Because the bar had actively directed numerous individuals to
park in the various lots and made several physical changes to the lots,
the court reasoned that bar was effectively in control of the parking
lots.33 Another factor used by the court is whether the landowner
derives an economic benefit from the off-premises property.34 In fact,
"courts often utilize this factor in making a policy argument in favor of
extending liability to include adjacent property. 35
In Shelburne, this factor also lent support to the court's assessment
of liability on the bar. The facts indicated that the bar had a capacity of
240 people, but that the bar would often admit as many as 270 to 300
people with fifty to seventy-five people waiting outside,36 many of
whom, as noted above, were required to park in adjacent lots. 37 The
court noted that because the bar was fully aware that numerous cars
parked in other lots, 38 and because a jury could have found that the bar
was "in effect, utilizing the adjacent parking lots rent free for their own
business purposes, 3 9 liability was justified under the circumstances
28. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 324.
29. See Warner, supra note 9, at 603.
30. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
31. Id.
32. Id. (The lot in which the injuries were incurred was on the east side of the bar, while the
lot in which the lights were installed was on the west side. While the west lot was owned by the
state, this establishes a history of the bar exercising control over areas which it did not own.).
33. Id. at 328-29.
34. See Warner, supra note 9, at 606.
35. Id.
36. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 328.
37. Id.
38. The court emphatically noted that not only did the bar know that those individuals were
parking in the lot, but that the bar had actively directed them to park there. In other words, the bar
was intentionally deriving a benefit from those lots. Id. at 329.
39. Id.
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because the bar had derived a substantial economic benefit from the use
of the lots. 40
The final factor the Shelburne court used in determining off-prem-
ises liability is when the off-premises injury to an invitee is foreseeable
to the landowner.4' The Shelburne court noted that, in order to impose
liability on a tavern owner for injuries to patrons caused by third parties,
the risk of harm beyond his own premises must be reasonably foresee-
able.42 The court added, however, that "a tavern owner's actual or con-
structive knowledge, based on past experience, that there is a likelihood
of disorderly conduct by third persons in general which may endanger
the safety of his patrons" is also sufficient to establish foreseeability.43
Considering the facts, the court noted that "the conflicting evidence of
the Rodeo Bar's inadequate security and fifty-eight police incident
reports of problems at the Rodeo Bar, including crimes against persons
within the past eighteen months, provided a basis for a finding of fore-
seeability. 44 Moreover, the court noted that "[f]ights occurred 'all the
time,' and on weekends there were three or four fights every night. ' 45
As the court notes "[c]learly, the fifty-eight offense reports pertaining to
prior criminal incidents at the Rodeo Bar are evidence of appellants'
knowledge of 'a likelihood of disorderly conduct by third persons in
general which may endanger the safety of his patrons."' 46
The Shelburne court found that the owner of the bar owed a duty of
care to its patrons while they were on the adjacent lot. In reaching this
conclusion, the court weighed all of the factors or circumstances and
debated the public policy implications related to this decision.47 Shel-
40. Id.
41. Id. In his article, Mr. Warner identifies two other factors which were used at the time that
the Shelburne decision was made: causation and status. See Warner, supra note 9, at 601-06.
Although Mr. Warner provides a very thorough analysis of those two factors in his article, the
present Comment assumes the invitee status and because the causation factor was not discussed in
any detail by the Shelburne court, it is likewise not discussed in this Comment.
42. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 325; Davis v. Johnson, 288 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
(holding that a landowner can be held liable for injuries inflicted by trespassers upon persons
outside his premises if he had reason to anticipate that the trespasser would engage in the conduct
which caused the injury and thereafter had a reasonable opportunity to prevent or control such
conduct). Note, however, that the trespasser in Davis left a gate open, allowing a cow to escape
and collide with a motorcycle passenger. Id. at 554-55. Because of this, Davis does not directly
apply to Shelburne, but serves as an example of how foreseeability has been applied previously.
43. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d at 326.
44. Id. at 326-27. It is not clear from the opinion whether the incidents occurred exclusively
on premises or if some of the incidents occurred off-premises.
45. Id. at 328.
46. Id. at 331. Although the court does not explicitly state that such an incident was
inevitable, the court uses strong language to the effect that the shooting which occurred on the
night in question was likely, and certainly foreseeable.
47. See generally Warner, supra note 9.
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burne, however, did not establish a clearly defined standard for impos-
ing off-premises liability."8 Although the court noted factors which
could be determinative of whether or not an off-premises duty of care
exists, the court did not provide any guidance to subsequent courts con-
sidering off-premises liability. While the factors of control, economic
benefit, and foreseeability were considered in Shelburne, the court failed
to indicate whether all of the factors needed to be present, or whether
any one factor could be sufficient to find that the landowner owed an
off-premises duty of care.
Consequently, the Shelburne decision merely indicates that a land-
owner owes a duty of care to those invitees that a landowner directs to
park in a certain area or act in a certain way, for his own economic
benefit, and the resulting injury is foreseeable. Unfortunately, this does
not serve as a readily effective standard for subsequent cases. Subse-
quent case law shows that the courts have essentially abandoned the
Shelburne analysis and have adopted a more coherent standard for
imposing an off-premises duty of care. Generally known as the "fore-
seeable zone of risk" standard, this standard has expanded a landowner's
duty of care in relation to off-premises invitees. In doing so, however, it
has created a more functional and flexible standard whereby the land-
owner will be better equipped to determine whether he owes a duty of
care to off-premises invitees.
III. OFF-PREMISES LIABILITY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE SHELBURNE; THE
ADOPTION OF THE FORESEEABLE ZONE OF RISK STANDARD
OVER THE SHELBURNE STANDARD.
After the Shelburne decision, Florida courts have abandoned"9
Shelburne's formalistic application of the factors and have created a
much more workable and flexible standard. Known as the foreseeable
zone of risk standard, this new standard is equitable to both landowners
and injured off-premises invitees. Furthermore, the courts have become
increasingly more willing to find that a landowner owes a duty of care to
invitees who are off-premises.50
Under the new standard, the courts have generally found that a
landowner owes a duty of care to an off-premises invitee when the land-
48. See Johnson v. Howard Mark Prods., 608 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Johnson
does not explicitly make this assertion. However, the Johnson court indicated that because there
are "occasions" where off-premises liability may be justified, a case-specific standard is required.
Id.
49. While the formalistic application of the factors has been abandoned, a judge may still not
consider such factors as control, foreseeability, and economic benefit, when determining whether
the landowner has extended his foreseeable zone of risk.
50. See generally Johnson v. Howard Mark Prods., 608 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
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owner has extended a foreseeable zone of risk beyond his own prem-
ises.5' Moreover, the courts have employed three ways in which a
landowner may extend his foreseeable zone of risk beyond his own
premises: 1) the landowner creates a dangerous condition where it is
foreseeable that an invitee may be injured off-premises;52 2) the land-
owner fails to properly maintain the area of ingress or egress to his prop-
erty;53 or 3) the landowner assumes a duty to protect invitees while they
are off-premises.54
A. Creation of a Dangerous Condition
One of the first cases, involving the foreseeable zone of risk was
McCain v. Florida Power Corp.55 Thomas McCain was injured while
operating a mechanical trencher when the blade struck an underground
electrical cable owned by Florida Power Corporation.56 McCain was
operating the machinery in an area which the Florida Power Corporation
had marked as a "safe" area.57 In its analysis, the Florida Supreme
Court stated that "the duty element of negligence focuses on whether the
defendant's conduct foreseeably created a broader 'zone of risk' that
poses a general threat of harm to others. '58 The court further added that
"Florida, like other jurisdictions, recognizes that a legal duty will arise
whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized and foreseeable risk
of harming others."59
The court continued its analysis and stated that duty may arise from
four sources: 1) legislative enactments; 2) judicial interpretations of leg-
islative enactments or administrative regulations; 3) other judicial prece-
dent; and 4) a duty arising from the general facts of the case.6" The
Florida Supreme Court determined that McCain dealt with the last cate-
gory, duty arising from the general facts of the case, because the duty
arose due to a foreseeable zone of risk arising from the acts of the defen-
dant. The court further noted that "[w]here a defendant's conduct cre-
51. Id. at 938.
52. Id. These cases do not deal with previously noted situations in which the landowner
releases toxic chemicals from his property to adjacent property. Nor do they involve similar cases
where the landowner causes harm from his own premises which injures individuals off-premises.
In those cases something created or owned by the landowner escaped his premises and directly
caused injury to off-premises individuals. See generally PROSSER, supra note 1, at 387.
53. Gutierrez v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 604 So. 2d 852, 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
54. Union Park Mem'l Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So. 2d 64, 66-67 (Fla. 1996).
55. 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992).
56. Id. at 501.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 502.
59. Id. at 503.
60. Id.
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ates a foreseeable zone of risk, the law generally will recognize a duty
placed upon defendant to either lessen the risk or see that sufficient pre-
cautions are taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses."6
Although McCain did not deal directly with off-premises liability,
it served as a pronouncement by the Florida Supreme Court that an indi-
vidual may owe a duty of care whenever facts of the specific case indi-
cate that the individual created a foreseeable zone of risk to another
party.62 By making the standard case specific and failing to limit or
qualify the foreseeable zone of risk, the McCain Court allowed for the
possibility of the foreseeable zone of risk extending to certain off-prem-
ises areas.
A mere eleven months later, that possibility became a reality when
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal was confronted with that very
issue in Johnson v. Howard Mark Productions, Inc.63 In Johnson, the
personal representative for the estate of Jason Johnson appealed a sum-
mary judgment entered in favor of Howard Mark Productions, Inc.64
The facts alleged in the complaint were that an automobile struck and
killed Johnson on June 4, 1988, while Johnson attempted to cross U.S
Highway 41 in Bradenton, Florida, to patronize a nightclub owned by
the defendant.65 Johnson and several others parked on the opposite side
of the highway because, as the complaint alleged, the nightclub had
"woefully insufficient" parking.66 The complaint did not allege, nor do
the facts indicate, that the defendant directed or instructed Johnson or
the others to park across the highway.67 However, it was alleged, that
the inadequate parking was a dangerous condition of which the defen-
dant knew or should have known.6 8
In its analysis the court noted that "although a landowner is most
commonly liable for injuries that occur on the property, there are occa-
sions when a landowner may be liable for a dangerous condition that
results in injury off the premises. '"69 The court then added that:
61. Id. at 503. The court went on to find that the power company had the ability to foresee a
zone of risk. Id. at 504. "By its very nature, power generating equipment creates a zone of risk
that encompasses all persons who foreseeably may come in contact with that equipment." Id. The
court held that a reasonable jury could have found the power company owed a duty of care to
McCain. Id.
62. Id. at 503-04.
63. 608 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
64. See id. at 938.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Note that in Shelburne the patrons were specifically instructed to park in the adjacent
lot. See Holiday Inns v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
68. See Johnson, 608 So. 2d at 938.
69. Id.
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the general standard of care which the common law places on all
landowners to protect invitees under a wide spectrum of circum-
stances can authorize a case-specific standard of care requiring pro-
tection of invitees on nearby property if the landowner's foreseeable
zone of risk extends beyond the boundaries of its property.7"
In doing so, the Johnson court reversed an order for summary judgment
in favor of the landowner and held that general issues of material fact
existed as to whether the landowner had extended his foreseeable zone
of risk.7
This decision is representative of the movement by state courts in
Florida to abandon the formalistic application of the factors set out in
Shelburne. While the Johnson court cited Shelburne for the proposition
that a landowner could owe an off-premises duty of care,72 the court
chose not to apply all of the factors listed in Shelburne. Instead, John-
son held that the allegations that the land owner failed to provide ade-
quate parking and invitees would have to cross a dangerous highway
were sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the
landowner.7
3
Even though the facts in Johnson were not as compelling as those
in Shelburne, the Johnson court found genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the landowner had extended his foreseeable zone of risk."
Under the Johnson analysis, the circumstances under which a landowner
will owe a duty of care to off-premises invitees in Florida may have
increased.75 More importantly, by applying the foreseeable zone of risk
analysis, the Johnson court has abandoned a formalistic application of
70. Id.
71. Id. at 939. The court added that, in order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment,
the movant must show unequivocally that there was not negligence, or that the plaintiffs
negligence was sole proximate cause of injury. Although it could be asserted in Johnson that
Johnson's act of crossing the highway was the sole proximate cause of his injury, that argument
would not have been readily applicable in this case because of the 1988 decision reached by the
Florida Supreme Court in Cosby v. Flint, 520 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1988) (which held that although
generally a possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any
activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, a possessor would be
liable if he should anticipate the harm). Applying this rationale to Johnson, despite the obvious
dangers of crossing the highway, if it were shown that the landowner knew or should have known
that individuals were crossing the highway to get to his premises, his liability would not be
eliminated.
72. See Johnson, 608 So. 2d at 938.
73. Id. at 939.
74. Id. at 938.
75. It should be noted that in each case, the plaintiff continues to bear the burden of pleading
sufficient ultimate facts to demonstrate all elements: the foreseeable zone of risk, the duty of the
landowner, and the breach of that duty. In Short v. Lakeside Cmty. Church, 700 So. 2d 772 (Fla.
2d DCA 1997), a child was struck by a car while crossing the street adjacent to a church operated
school where she attended. Id. at 773. The court noted that the plaintiff had not plead sufficient
facts to establish a foreseeable zone of risk. Id. Thus, in the absence of a pleading that the
[Vol. 55:397
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the factors set out in Shelburne in favor of a more workable and flexible
standard to determine the landowner's foreseeable zone of risk. Under
this new flexible standard, courts will now simply ask the question, "has
the owner extended his foreseeable zone of risk, by creating a dangerous
condition such that he owes a duty of care to off-premises invitees?"
This standard has already been applied in subsequent cases throughout
Florida.
Perhaps no case is more indicative of the abandonment of the appli-
cation of the Shelburne factors than Gunlock v. Gill Hotels Co.,76
because this case was from the same court which decided Shelburne. In
Gunlock, a plaintiff brought an action against a hotel for the death of an
invitee struck and killed by a car while he crossed a highway to get from
one part of the hotel to another.77
The Fourth District Court of Appeal could have cited Shelburne, its
own precedent, and applied the factors set out in that case. However, the
Gunlock court did not do so. Instead it cited Johnson and noted:
[g]enerally, where a landowner creates a foreseeable zone of risk, a
landowner has a duty either to lessen the risk or take sufficient pre-
cautions to protect invitees from the harm the risk poses. Thus, a
landowner may be required to protect invitees on nearby property if a
landowner's foreseeable zone of risk extends beyond the boundaries
of its property.78
In Gunlock, the court found that where an invitee must cross a cer-
tain dangerous area in order to get from one side of the premises to
another, the landowner will have created a dangerous condition and
extended his foreseeable zone of risk beyond his own premises. 79 The
Gunlock court continued and held that as a result of the extension of the
foreseeable zone of risk, the landowner's hotel had a duty to "provide its
guests with reasonably safe passage across the highway."80
One notable point is that in order to extend the foreseeable zone of
risk, the condition created by the landowner must be dangerous. There-
fore, failure to provide adequate parking or requiring an invitee to cross
a certain area in order to get from one portion of the premises to another,
does not, by itself create a dangerous condition. However, as seen in the
landowner created the dangerous condition, such as failing to provide parking or causing the
invitee to cross a highway, there is generally no duty.
76. 622 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
77. See id. at 163-64. Although the plaintiff did not drink in the hotel bar, he was visibly
intoxicated when he left it in an attempt to reach his hotel room, which was located across the
highway. Id. at 164.
78. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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previous cases, courts have found that dangerous conditions may exist
when the two factors are combined.8
Moreover, it should be noted that even in those cases where a dan-
gerous condition is found to exist, the landowner is not automatically
liable. Thus, in the previous cases no liability would have been found if
the landowners had taken necessary precautions to protect invitees and/
or to correct the dangerous conditions. In other words, if the landowner
complies with his duty of care he would not be liable.
In Wakefield v. Winterhaven Management, Inc. 82 the court
addressed the issue of off-premises liability as it related to damage to
property owned by an invitee.83 There, the plaintiff attended a car show
and checked into a hotel nearby. Upon checking in, a desk clerk told him
the motel had hired two security guards for the auto show.84 At the car
show, the plaintiff traded his Corvette for another valued at approxi-
mately $30,000-$50,000. Upon his return to the hotel, the plaintiff
parked in a white lined parking space twenty feet from his hotel room
door. The parking space was not on the actual premises of the hotel.85
The evidence demonstrated that the hotel knew that guests parked in
those spots, and that guests were never told not to park there.
The court cited Shelburne for the proposition that a landowner
could be liable for injuries to invitees which occur off-premises and
asserted that where a landowner uses an adjacent premises for its own
business purposes, the landowner owes a duty of care to invitees and
their property on those adjacent premises.86 The court concluded that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the hotel had
reason to know that its patrons routinely parked on the adjacent
property.87
Again, this case is representative of the court's movement away
from the application of the factors in Shelburne. Although the Wakefield
court cited Shelburne it did not mention any of the factors set forth
81. In almost every inadequate parking case, a dangerous condition is only found to exist
where the invitee is forced to cross a dangerous highway, or park in an adjacent lot wherein
known dangers exist. No court has said that mere inadequate parking is a dangerous condition.
See Short v. Lakeside Cmty. Church, 700 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (finding that inadequate
parking alone is not a dangerous condition).
82. 685 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
83. The previously noted cases all involved personal injury to the invitee which occurred off-
premises. This case deals with injury or damage to property owned by an invitee which occurs
off-premises.
84. Wakefield, 685 So. 2d at 1348.
85. Id. at 1349. The space was shown to be approximately seven feet from the actual hotel. In
fact, it was so close to the hotel bar that guests as well as delivery persons routinely parked there.
Id.
86. Id. at 1349.
87. Id.
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therein, despite the fact that many of those factors may have existed.
For example, there was evidence that the motel may have exercised con-
trol over the lot by painting lines for the parking spaces, that the motel
derived an economic benefit from patrons parking in that lot, and that
injury was foreseeable.88
Even though those factors may have existed in Wakefield, the court
did not base its decision on their presence. Instead, the court reversed
summary judgment on the grounds that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the landowner was aware that its patrons
routinely parked in the parking spaces.89 The court further noted that if
the hotel had reason to know that its guests parked in that area it had a
duty to warn them that the parking lot was not hotel property and that
they would be parking there at there own risk.90
This case does not apply the rigid factors set forth in Shelburne.
Instead, it applies a foreseeable zone of risk analysis which asserts that a
landowner may create a dangerous condition when the landowner is
aware that its invitees are parking off-premises in a dangerous area and
the landowner fails to provide any notice of that fact to his invitees. 9'
The aforementioned cases show that Florida courts have abandoned
the explicit application of the factors set forth in Shelburne, and created
an expansive, but effective and predictable standard to determine off-
premises duty of care. The current standard in Florida is that the land-
owner may owe an off-premises duty of care where the landowner's
foreseeable zone of risk extends beyond his own premises.
Similarly, those cases assert that one way in which a landowner
may extend his foreseeable zone of risk is where a landowner creates a
dangerous condition such that there is a foreseeable risk of injury to off-
premises invitees. The owner has a duty to remedy or correct those
risks, or he may be subject to off-premises liability. It should be noted
that while the explicit application of the factors set forth in Shelburne
has been abandoned, the courts may generally consider those factors in
the analysis of all the generally accepted ways in which a foreseeable
zone of risk may be extended off-premises.
B. Area of Ingress and Egress
The second generally accepted way in which a business landowner
may extend his foreseeable zone of risk, is by failing to properly main-
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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tain the areas of ingress and egress of his property. The following cases
demonstrate how that standard has been applied in Florida.
In Dawson v. Ridgley,92 a motorcycle passenger sued an automobile
driver and shopping center owner for injuries sustained in a motor vehi-
cle accident when an automobile driver exited the shopping center and
struck the motorcycle. The automobile driver filed a cross claim against
the shopping center owner.93
In its analysis of the automobile driver's claim, the court focused
on the issue of whether the landowner had negligently constructed the
entrance/exit to his shopping center.94 The court then held that "there is
a duty in Florida owed by a landowner to his business invitees to keep
his property reasonably safe and to protect such invitees from dangers of
which he is or should be aware."95 Even though the court did not
expressly use the term "area of ingress or egress," this case set the prece-
dent that a landowner owes a duty of care to his invitees in his areas of
entrance/exit from his property.
In Gutierrez v. Dade County School Board,9 6 the same court
addressed ingress and egress liability. A student was parked in a school
parking lot waiting for his girlfriend. The girlfriend entered the car and
the two students began to leave. While they were in the driveway,
another student approached the car while another individual ran up to
the side of the car and put a gun to the driver's head.97 The driver accel-
erated and was shot a few feet off of the school's premises. 98 The
school board in that case moved for summary judgment on the ground
that it did not owe the driver a duty of care because the actual shooting
occurred a few feet beyond its property line.99
The court noted that "a landowner is under a duty to invitees to
maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition."" ° The court con-
tinued: "[t]hat duty extends to the means which the landowner has
expressly provided for use by the invitees for ingress and egress."' 0 1
92. 554 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
93. Id. at 624. Since this Comment deals with invitees, the claim of the motorcycle passenger
is not germane to this analysis. Nonetheless, as related to that claim, the court held that a
"landowner has no duty to a passing motorist to maintain his property in such a way that a driver
exiting his property has a completely unobstructed view of intersecting traffic, including the
passing motorist." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 625.
96. 604 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
97. Id. at 853.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. See also Garcia v. City of Hialeah, 550 So. 2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
(holding that a landowner has a duty of care to invitees to properly maintain the areas of ingress
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This case affirmed the principle that a landowner owes a duty to main-
tain the areas of ingress and egress in a reasonably safe condition, but
extended that principle to include any off-premises area which is
intended to serve as the area of ingress and egress. 10 2 In other words, a
landowner's foreseeable zone of risk extends to the areas of ingress and
egress.
Finally, Thompson v. Gallo"°3 provides another example of how
courts have analyzed the issue of the area of ingress and egress liability.
In that case, an individual was attempting to turn into a public parking
lot from a very busy street, but collided with another vehicle in the pro-
cess of turning into the parking lot."° Testimony at trial"°5 indicated
that the entrance and exit were not clearly indicated, and that the vehicle
turning into the lot was actually turning into what was the exit of the
parking lot.' 0 6 Moreover, expert testimony10 7 indicated that the accident
was proximately caused by a lack of clear identification of the driveway
usage as either an exit or an entrance. 0 8 In its decision, the court held
that [b]usiness property owners have a duty to provide safe ingress and
egress to their premises. 0 9
Although the previously noted cases all extend a landowner's
potential liability beyond his own premises, the standard is clear. A
landowner's foreseeable zone of risk extends to any area that he
and egress by using reasonable efforts to ensure that visibility in the area of ingress and egress was
not obstructed).
102. It should be noted, however, that a landowner's liability is not limitless in areas of ingress
and egress. See e.g. Concepcion v. Archdiocese of Miami, 693 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
In Concepcion, a student was assaulted after school hours by another individual. The court noted
the Gutierrez decision, but held that a landowner owes no duty of care to invitees for events
occurring solely off the landowner's premises and which are wholly unconnected to any activity
on the landowner's premises. Id. at 1106. In other words, the injury must be rationally related to
the invitation.
103. 680 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
104. Id. at 442 (the injuries occurred entirely off-premises on the street).
105. A police officer at the scene testified that the vehicle was entering what was actually the
exit. Id.
106. Id.
107. An expert in accident reconstruction opined that the lack of clear identification of the
driveway usage caused a delay in the driver's turn into the lot, which caused the other car to hit
that vehicle. Id. at 442-43.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 443 (citing IRE Florida Income Partners, Ltd. v. Scott, 381 So. 2d 1114, 1117 (Fla.
' DCA (1979) for the proposition that:
The duty to keep the premises safe for invitees extends to all portions of the
premises that are included in the invitation and that are necessary or convenient for
the invitee to visit or use in the course of the business for which the invitation was
extended... "The duty extends to approaches to the premises which are open to
invitees in connection with their business on the premises, and which are so located
and constituted as to represent an invitation to visit the place of business and to use
such means of approach". Id.)
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expressly provides or utilizes as a means of ingress or egress. Thus, the
landowner has a duty to maintain those areas in a reasonably safe
condition.
C. Assumption of Duty
The final way in which a landowner exposes himself to off-prem-
ises liability is when a landowner gratuitously assumes to undertake a
certain action off-premises. The Supreme Court of Florida squarely
addressed this issue in a 1996 decision.
In Union Park Memorial Chapel v. Hutt"O a motorist was injured
when traveling through a red light as part of a funeral procession. The
funeral director voluntarily undertook to organize and lead the funeral
procession.' The court stated that "[i]t is clearly established that one
who undertakes to act, even when under no obligation to do so, thereby
becomes obligated to act with reasonable care."' 12
In so doing, the Florida Supreme Court set an unambiguous stan-
dard. Namely, where a landowner undertakes to act off-premises, the
landowner will owe a duty of care to invitees such that he faces potential
liability for off-premises injuries. He extends his foreseeable zone of
risk to those areas in which he assumes a duty to act or perform a certain
function, beyond his property boundary.
IV. OFF-PREMISES LIABILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In order to fully appreciate the issue of off-premises liability in
Florida, one must compare it to the rule in other jurisdictions. This sur-
vey will not only show that some jurisdictions have standards resulting
in more or less landowner liability than Florida, but it will also show
how Florida's foreseeable zone of risk analysis is an effective and effi-
cient method of establishing off-premises duty.
A. Conservative Application of Off-Premises Liability
A number of jurisdictions have been reluctant to impose a duty of
care upon a landowner extending beyond his own premises. In Ferreira
v. Strack,"3 the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed a case that was
factually similar to Johnson. In Ferreira, an intoxicated driver struck
church parishioners while they were crossing a public street to reach the
parking lot where they had parked their car. The complaint contended
that the church owed those parking in the lot a duty to control traffic
110. 670 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 1996).
111. Id. at 69.
112. Id. at 66-67.
113. 636 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1994).
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because the church knew that a substantial number of parishioners
would cross the highway to reach their cars after Mass ended.' 14 These
claims closely resemble those made in Johnson, wherein a duty was
found to exist.115 In its analysis, the Ferreira court held that:
[u]nder the doctrine of premises liability a landowner has a duty to
exercise reasonable care toward persons reasonably expected to be on
his or her premises. The rationale for the imposition of this duty rests
firmly on the landowner's possession of the premises and his or her
attendant right and obligation to control the premises. 116
Moreover, the court noted that "[n]either the lack of adequate park-
ing nor the foreseeability that many parishioners would park in the
nearby lot requiring them to cross Broadway1" 7 warrants the imposition
of a duty to control traffic on a public highway." '18 In its rationale the
court declared three reasons why such a duty should not be applied:
First, a landowner does not own or possess an abutting public way
and therefore has no right to control such a public way. Second, the
landowner has no control over the instrumentality causing the injury.
Third, the protection of the public while on a public way is a duty
allocated to the government, not to private individuals who own land
abutting public ways.119
This jurisdiction and those with similar precedent have set a bright-line
standard which limits liability to those areas that the landowner actually
owns or controls.
Santoleri v. Knightly,"12 a New York case which is factually similar
to Johnson and, in some regards, Shelburne, represents an example of
why a bright-line standard is often ineffective and inequitable. In
Santoleri, the plaintiffs were attending a funeral in which the parking lot
was full. Upon their arrival an employee of the funeral home instructed
the plaintiffs to park across the street in a lot which was neither owned
nor operated by the funeral home.121 Despite the inadequate parking and
the instructions to park elsewhere, the court held that "the funeral home
owed no duty to plaintiffs to exercise due care preventing off-premises
114. Id.; see also Jacobs v. Anderson Bldg. Co., 459 N.W.2d 384, 386 (N.D. 1990) (holding
that a landowner does not generally owe a duty beyond that area which he controls).
115. It should be noted however, that in this case, it is unclear whether the church provided
parking, and to what degree that parking was adequate.
116. Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685 (citations omitted).
117. Broadway is the name of the highway that the parishioners were required to cross.
118. Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 688. The court further noted that there was no duty to protect an
individual from injury by a third party on land which is not owned, possessed or controlled by the
landowner. Id. at 686.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. 663 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
121. Id. at 506.
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injuries on an adjacent highway it did not own or control." '122
Those jurisdictions which have attempted to limit a duty of care
only to those areas in which the landowner has actual control, possession
or ownership have created a bright-line standard which often leads to
ineffective and unjust results. Even if the owner puts the invitee in dan-
ger, he may not owe a duty of care to the invitee and therefore will not
be liable for off-premises injuries.
B. Liberal Application of Off-Premises Liability
While the previously noted cases provide a sample of how certain
jurisdictions have been reluctant to extend liability beyond the owner's
premise, numerous jurisdictions have applied a more liberal standard so
as to avoid inequitable results.
In Ember v. B.F.D23 a bar patron was assaulted in a parking lot
across from a bar, which was often used by patrons.1 24 The bar was very
well known and there had been previous instances of criminal activity in
the areas adjacent to the bar.' 25 The court held that "liability is not lim-
ited to the area owned or leased, but extends to adjoining areas which
harbor a dangerous condition created by the owner's special benefit or
use of such areas." 126 The court added that "a duty of reasonable care
may be extended beyond the business premises when . . . the invitor
knows his invitees customarily use such adjacent premises in connection
with the invitation." 1 27 In so holding, the court essentially adopted a
"foreseeable zone of risk" standard, the current standard in Florida. 28
In Mulraney v. Auletto's Catering1 29 the New Jersey courts ana-
lyzed the issue of off-premises liability as it specifically related to off-
premises parking.131 In Mulraney, the invitee arrived at a "Bridal Fair"
and in an effort to avoid valet parking, parked her own car in an exterior
parking lot. After she parked, however, one of the "Bridal Fair" employ-
ees told her that she would have to move her car as that lot was reserved
122. Id. at 508; see also Southland v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that existence of a business proprietor's duty of care with respect to patrons injured by
criminal acts of third persons which occur on property adjacent to business premises, which is
neither owned nor possessed by proprietor, depends on the proprietor's actual or apparent control
of the adjacent premises).
123. 490 N.E.2d 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
124. Id. at 766.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 773.
127. Id. at 772.
128. Note that although the court does not expressly use the term "foreseeable zone of risk,"
the court's analysis is comparable. Moreover, as this case was decided in 1986, Indiana adopted
its standard several years before Florida did.
129. 680 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1996).
130. Id.
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for the valet parking. 3' The invitee moved to an adjacent lot, and was
struck by a vehicle while crossing the highway.
132
The court took an interesting approach to analyzing this problem.
It chose not to use the foreseeable zone of risk standard, but instead
specifically dealt with the issue of a landowner's duty of care as related
to invitees crossing the highway.133 The court held that a landowner has
a duty to provide reasonably safe passage for patrons who must cross a
highway to reach its parking lot.1 34 The court added that:
a substantial commercial enterprise that owns property immediately
adjoining a highway has the ability to illuminate an area where
pedestrians are likely to cross and/or to provide warnings of the dan-
ger both to motorists and to pedestrians and, if necessary, to hire off
duty police officers to control motor vehicular and pedestrian
traffic. ' 35
The court took a liberal approach to the duty of care as it relates to
off-premises invitees, but chose to analyze the problem from a narrow
perspective instead of setting a general foreseeable zone of risk standard.
Although these cases only provide a sample of how certain jurisdic-
tions have chosen to analyze the issue of off-premises duty of care, they
have shown that the courts will generally take one of three approaches:
1) they will draw a bright-line standard which generally revolves around
control of the adjacent premises; 2) they will allow off-premises liability
in certain circumstances, without establishing an easily applicable stan-
dard; or 3) they will establish a standard such as the foreseeable zone of
risk, which dictates a duty whenever a landowner expands his foresee-
able zone of risk.
V. THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN OFF-PREMISEs LIABILITY
The role of insurance must be incorporated into the analysis of
whether the foreseeable zone of risk is a more equitable/efficient stan-
dard for the determination of off-premises liability than the other previ-
ously mentioned standards.
In Illinois Insurance Exchange v. Scottsdale Insurance136 a Florida
court analyzed the role of insurance as it relates to off-premises liability.
In that case, a bar located in Miami Beach served alcohol to under-aged
patrons. These patrons were later attacked by several other under-aged
131. Id. at 794.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 795.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court noted that this was especially true where the event was a large function
which occurs in isolated situations. Id. at 796.
136. 679 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
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individuals, who had also been served at the bar.'3 7 The injuries
occurred entirely off-premises.1 38 The question before the court was
whether the comprehensive general liability policy or the liquor liability
insurance was liable for the injuries. The court held that there were gen-
uine issues of material fact regarding whether the service of alcohol to
minors contributed to the claimant's damages. 3 9 The court further
noted that if the negligent service of alcohol was the proximate cause of
the injury then the liquor, insurance would be liable. Otherwise, the
comprehensive insurance was obligated to pay.'40
This case is of vital importance because the injuries occurred
entirely off-premise. It asserts that a landowner will be able to procure
insurance that will cover off-premises injuries to invitees.' 4' As such,
the foreseeable zone of risk analysis presents a very equitable standard
for off-premises liability. Even where the landowner creates a foresee-
able zone of risk, and invitees are injured, the landowner may be cov-
ered by insurance. The landowner may thus avoid bearing an undue
burden for off-premises liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Three goals were proposed at the inception of this comment: 1)
That the foreseeable zone of risk standard has supplanted the formalistic
application of the factors set forth in Shelburne; 2) That the foreseeable
zone of risk standard can be used to determine when a landowner will
owe a duty of care to off-premises invitees, such that he may be liable
for off-premises injuries; 3) That the foreseeable zone of risk standard is
an effective and equitable standard, despite the fact that it may lead to an
increased duty of care and potential liability.
This Comment analyzed the development of a landowner's duty of
care beginning with the Shelburne case and followed with an analysis of
the development of the "foreseeable zone of risk" standard. In so doing,
this paper has illustrated the evolution of off-premises duty of care. In
Shelburne, the court looked at certain circumstances and factors, and
held that under those particular circumstances it would be equitable and
justifiable to find that the landowner owed an off-premises duty of care.
137. Id. at 356.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 358. Commercial general liability policies insurance apply to bodily injury,
property damage, personal injury, advertising injury, and medical expenses arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of the premises. See, eg., Southeast Farms, Inc. v. Auto-Owners
Ins. Co., 714 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
141. See Illinois Ins. Exch., 679 So. 2d at 358.
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Unfortunately, Shelburne did not establish a definite and workable stan-
dard concerning off-premises liability.
As a result, subsequent courts abandoned Shelburne and shifted the
focus of analysis to whether the landowner expanded his "foreseeable
zone of risk" beyond his own premises. A landowner may do this either
by: 1) Creating a dangerous condition; 2) Failing to properly maintain
areas of ingress and egress; or 3) Assuming a duty beyond the land-
owner's premises.
Although that shift in analysis corresponds with an increase in off-
premises duty of care cases, it also establishes a workable standard by
which landowners can determine whether they owe invitees a duty of
care beyond the premises. The landowner must ask himself: 1) have I
created a dangerous condition which extends beyond my premises; 2)
have I failed to reasonably maintain my areas of ingress or egress; or 3)
have I assumed a duty of care beyond my premises? If the landowner
can affirmatively answer any of those questions, then the foreseeable
zone of risk is extended. The landowner owes a duty of care to his
invitees to any area where his foreseeable zone of risk extends.
Florida has adopted a standard that appears to be far more equitable
and efficient than other jurisdictions, which either strictly limit liability
or focus on such issues as control or ownership. The Florida standard
merely requires the landowner to question whether he has endangered
his invitees while they are off-premises. If so, then reasonable steps
must be taken to protect those invitees. Finally, the availability of insur-
ance will spare the owner the direct expense of liability.
The Florida "foreseeable zone of risk" standard is the most efficient
and equitable standard for the determination of off-premises liability
because 1) the landowner has a standard by which to determine his duty
of care, 2) the invitee will be protected where the owner breaches his
duty, and 3) the owner will be protected to some degree by insurance.
No one is unjustly damaged or enriched. More importantly, owners and
insurers have an incentive to take reasonable precautions to protect their
invitees. For the foregoing reasons Florida has properly adopted, and
should continue to apply, the foreseeable zone of risk standard as
opposed to the Shelburne and the other available standards.
PETER LoPEz*
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